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Depression and Political Predispositions: 
A Bias Against the Right? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between depression – the most common mental health 
problem in our societies – and political predispositions. Drawing on cross-disciplinary 
research from psychology, psychiatry and political science, the paper uses data from 
Understanding Society and the European Social Survey to test this relationship with party 
identification, vote intentions and left-right orientation, and two different measures of self-
rated clinical depression and depressive symptoms. Empirical analyses find a modest but 
significant, common tendency: individuals vulnerable to depression are less likely to identify 
with mainstream conservative parties, to vote for them and to be on the right side of the 
political spectrum. Instead, no clear evidence is found that they also identify less with 
political parties. These findings contribute to our understanding of differences in political 
predispositions, to the research on health and political behavior, and raise important 
implications for political engagement.  
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Introduction 
Depression is by this year estimated to produce the second largest disease burden in terms of 
cost to society (Lecrubier 2001). More than 300 million people are globally affected (WHO 
2018), nearly a fifth of adults, according to the UK Office for National Statistics (Guardian 
2013). Depression can occur at any point in a person’s lifetime and the probability of 
experiencing subsequent episodes increases with each episode (Kessing 1998; Solomon et al. 
2000). It affects multiple domains of psychosocial functioning, interpersonal relationships, 
occupational and academic functioning, and long-term psychological well being (for an 
overview, see: Dobson and Dozois 2008b), and people vulnerable to depression exhibit 
important emotional and cognitive biases (e.g., Beck et al. 1979; Gotlib and Joormann 2010). 
A range of psychological and physiological phenomena has recently been linked to ideology 
and vote choice (for a review see: Hibbing, Smith and Alford 2014) and political scientists 
have recently called for a greater engagement with health politics (Carpenter 2012). Yet, 
although scholars have recently included health as an independent variable for explaining 
mass politics and political behavior (Mattila et al. 2018a), depression as a mental health issue 
is still an important missing variable in empirical models of political attitudes. Previous work 
focuses on political participation and largely converges on the finding that bad health 
decreases the likelihood of voting (Denny and Doyle 2007; Mattila et al. 2013; Pacheco and 
Fletcher 2015; Couture and Breux 2017; Mattila et al. 2018b; Rapeli et al. 2018; but also see 
Gollust and Rahn 2015; Sund et al. 2017b), or reduces its initial probability (Ojeda and 
Pacheco 2017).1 
                                                
1 In parallel to the literature on health and political engagement develops the research on 
disability and political participation. This research tends to support the popular finding on 
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The finding that poor health reduces electoral participation has been extended to mental 
health, in that people with poor mental health, including depression, exhibit a lower 
probability of voting (Ojeda 2015; Sund et al. 2017b; Burden et al. 2017; Couture and Breux 
2017; Ojeda and Pacheco 2017; Ojeda and Slaughter 2019).   
Thus, previous research has identified an important depression-participation gap and has 
found significant differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals in their levels 
of political engagement. 2  Bridging research from psychology, psychiatry, and political 
science, this paper extends previous work to political attitudes and focuses on exploring 
ideological differences in political predispositions in people vulnerable to depression.3  
This is important because between 50% and 85% of individuals with depression experience 
multiple repeated episodes throughout their lifespan (Coyne, Pepper, and Flynn 1999) and a 
depressive episode can even last for years as some individuals are strongly resistant to anti-
depressants (Keller and Boland 1998). Indeed, psychological research suggests that cognitive 
biases in people with depression endure beyond discrete episodes (Joorman 2009, 301-4) and 
this point is supported by neuroimaging and histopathologic studies which have found 
evidence of functional and structural alterations of the brain in individuals with chronic 
depression (Greden 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                   
turnout from health studies, namely, that people with disabilities are less likely to vote (e.g., 
Schur et al. 2002; Schur and Adya 2013; Reher 2018). 
2 Turnout among people with poor health is about ten percentage points lower than among 
those with good health (e.g., Mattila et al. 2013). As for depression, a vote recall question is 
asked in Wave 2 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study showing a 6 percentage points 
difference between depressed and non-depressed respondents. 
3 To avoid repetition, I use the terms ‘depressed people’, ‘individuals with depression’ and 
‘depressives’ interchangeably. 
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The arguments that I develop in length in the next sections provide connections between 
depression and political predispositions – namely, party identification, vote choice and left-
right orientation – and help put forward mechanisms based on affective/emotional versus 
expressive/rational links that future research can test. My expectations are tested with data 
from Understanding Society, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), which 
provides questions for constructing measures of both diagnosed depression and depressive 
symptoms as well as of party identification and vote choice. Analyses of party identification 
are replicated for self-rated depressive symptoms on Western Europe with data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS), which substantiate the UK findings. ESS data are also used 
for testing the relationship between depressive symptoms and left-right orientation. 
My analyses reveal a modest but significant, common tendency: people vulnerable to 
depression are less likely to identify with mainstream right parties, less likely to vote for them 
(at least in the UK), and less likely to place themselves on the right side of the ideological 
spectrum. Additionally, two more findings emerge. First, there is no systematic evidence that 
people vulnerable to depression identify less with political parties. Second, I test for an 
alternative mechanism that is not based on ideology but on attitude to change. Unlike a recent 
research that finds evidence of a status quo bias in depressed people when it comes to 
political choice in situations of high uncertainty like the Brexit referendum (identifying 
reference removed), in the ‘normal’ context of a national election ideology still predominates.  
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, by including depression in models of 
political orientations, this study contributes to the wide literature on the differences in 
citizens’ political predispositions. Second, this paper also contributes to the emerging 
literature on health and political behavior by expanding the research on mental health beyond 
participation. Third, previous work tended to employ either more “objective” measures of 
clinical depression or “subjective” measures of depressive symptoms, whereas this study uses 
both, which is an added value. In the conclusions, I address the limitations of this study, 
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propose avenues for future research, and discuss the consequences of my findings for political 
engagement. 
Depression and political orientations: Left, right or status quo? 
Research on health and ideological orientation, partisanship or party choice is limited and 
rarely involves mental health. Here I provide an overview of existing research. Two studies 
from the United States find that individuals affiliating with the Republican Party report lower 
rates of poor health (Subramanian and Perkins 2009; Pacheco and Fletcher 2015). Similar 
conclusions were reached in Europe using left-right self-placements (Subramanian et al. 
2009) and Japan using a progressive-conservative self-reported scale (Subramanian et al. 
2010).  
In line with these findings, a study on voting patterns and mortality in England and Wales 
suggests that people with a better health and who live in better conditions would be less likely 
to take advantage of social welfare benefits, and so more likely to vote for the party that is the 
most likely to dismantle the welfare state (Smith and Dorling 1996). This interpretation is 
supported by a recent study which finds that voting propensity for Labour (Conservatives) 
increases (decreases) when health deteriorates (improves) (Rapeli et al. 2018).  
In the United States, research on disability produces mixed findings. An earlier study on New 
Mexicans (Gastil 2000) advocates a clear left bias (both in terms of party and self-
identification) of people with disabilities, due to liberal values like equality, compassion and 
tolerance. This view is not much supported by a more recent study based on data from 
nationally representative surveys (Schur and Adya 2013), which includes mental/emotional 
disabilities.  
At last, a study linking mental illness and party support measured as self-reported vote choice 
comes from a sample of 110 individuals with chronic mental illness in Germany and finds 
that the majority of these people stated they voted for a left-wing party in the 2002 federal 
elections (Bullenkamp and Voges 2004). 
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Overall, these studies seem to converge on a relationship between poor health and support for 
or identification with left parties and more liberal orientations. Here I provide arguments for 
why we could expect a similar tendency in people vulnerable to depression. The first and 
obvious explanation is that there is a relationship between depression and left-right 
orientation. It is difficult to test whether people vulnerable to depression are more liberal or 
liberals are more likely to be depressed, but the relationship is something I can test. This 
argument is related to ideology and policy – i.e. it is grounded on rationality and self-interest 
(e.g., Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981) – in that depressives like the redistributive, welfarist angle 
of the left and identify with or support left parties because they need the public health system, 
and so prefer a party that would spend more on it.4 The latter is a reversed version of the 
voting argument proposed by Smith and Dorling (1996), but also relates to the perception of 
left parties as “owners” (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996) of the health issue.5  
There is a second argument that is still relevant but I cannot test because the appropriate 
questions are not available in the data sets I am employing. This argument has to do with 
emotions and values and relates to the notion of party identification as a psychological and 
emotional attachment (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960). According to this argument, depressives 
would feel closer to left parties because they ascribe to those parties a positive image for 
                                                
4 However, people who refuse to get medical support might not necessarily support a stronger 
healthcare system because of their depression. 
5 Voters’ perception of ownership for health and social security as an exclusive prerogative of 
left-wing parties is found to be massively stable across countries and over time (Seeberg 
2016), confirming that such parties enjoy a high reputation for competently handling these 
issues. This image is also supported by experts’ placement of parties’ positions (Bakker et al. 
2015), where the left-right divide on issues such as redistribution and economic intervention 
is still considerably clearcut. 
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protecting the most vulnerable in the society or simply because they share such values 
themselves. In European democracies, mainstream left parties have historically been and still 
are perceived as the defenders of the weakest (Eley 2002). A long-term goal of left parties 
was traditionally the desire to achieve equality and create a society of caring, responsible and 
intelligent individuals, where altruism and caring are indeed the socially desirable “centre-left 
qualities of mind” (Nuttall 2006: 127). Being cognitively vulnerable for feeling hopeless and 
helpless (e.g., Beck et al. 1979; Abramson et al. 1978), people with depression need support 
and see it in a caring, empathetic and almost maternal left. In this sense depressives would 
perceive left parties to be more sympathetic and “humanitarianistic” (Feldman and 
Steenbergen 2001) than other parties with their condition because they ascribe such an image 
to them.6 So far, I have provided arguments for a relationship between vulnerability to 
depression and being on the left or identifying / supporting parties on the left. However, there 
are two alternative arguments that are worth considering. The first argument suggests that 
depressives would feel closer to or support conservative parties, or be more conservative. The 
second argument is not based on ideological differences but instead on attitudes to change. 
The first alternative argument builds on the literature from decision-making in depression, 
which considers risk aversion as a dominant criterion under which depressives take decisions. 
For instance, portfolio theories posit that depressives take a highly risk-averse strategy to 
minimize loss, actively attempting to resist change (Leahy 1997, 2001). Similarly, in the 
personality literature, conservativism is associated with caution and reticence regarding 
possible change (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008). Being highly risk-averse and scared of 
upheaval – in other words, conservative with a small “c” – it is also reasonable to expect that 
depressives might feel closer to right “conservative” parties more than to left “progressive” 
                                                
6 However, some depressed citizens might reject that kind of self-image or believe that it is 
not society's task to support them – especially those who were more right-wing to start with. 
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parties. This might perhaps depend on how heavily depressives weight their position on the 
redistributive taxes-versus-welfare dimension over the cultural conservative-libertarian 
dimension, and being left-wing on the former does not prevent them from leaning towards the 
right on the latter. Put it in terms of personality traits, it is not unrealistic that depressives’ 
personality could be a mix of emotional stability, conscientiousness and openness to 
experience, each trait applying to different ideological dimensions. 
The second alternative argument, still based on the research on decision-making in 
depression, advances a different mechanism. That is, being highly risk-averse and scared of 
upheaval depressives would prefer the status quo instead of change (identifying reference 
removed), and so they would identify with the incumbent party. If depressives feel at the 
mercy of political events rather than in control of them, then it may be that their attitudes are 
similarly compliant with context. If this is true, I should expect depressives to stick to the 
current incumbent if that party gets reelected or align with the new status quo – i.e. the new 
incumbent – after an election.   
To sum up, what I can test below is whether there is a relationship between depression and 
political predispositions, in which direction it goes, and whether it is based on ideological 
differences or attitudes to change. However, I can also test for another tendency. Given 
previous evidence for a depression-voting gap, below I argue that there also can be a 
depression-identification gap. 
 
Depression and party identification: Negative or null effects? 
Symptoms of depression (see the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
DSM-5) include fatigue and loss of energy, diminished ability to think or concentrate, 
feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt, diminished interest or pleasure 
in life activities, and feelings of sadness, emptiness and hopelessness. By impairing the 
motivation and the resources required to participate, depression affects people’s life activities 
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and has implications for their cognitive, emotional and physical involvement into politics.  
Research on health and political behavior suggests that depression and, more generally, poor 
mental health have negative consequences for political participation and finds that turnout 
tends to decrease among sufferers (Sund et al. 2017b; Burden et al. 2017; Couture and Breux 
2017). Research on turnout and depression in young adults reports comparable findings 
(Ojeda 2015), but also challenges conventional wisdom that the probability of voting 
uniformly increases across young adulthood (Ojeda and Pacheco 2017). Thus, findings on 
voting are not surprising if we note that depressed people make decisions that promote their 
social isolation and withdrawal (Pietromonaco and Rook 1987), exhibit feelings of 
hopelessness (Abramson et al. 1978), mistrust positive emotions (Paulus and Yu 2012) and 
show low self-efficacy (Maciejewski et al. 2000). 
If depressed people feel helpless and hopeless, tend to be more socially isolated and 
withdrawal, and their condition significantly impairs their motivation and pleasure to 
participate in daily life activities, including politics, then, in line with previous studies on 
turnout and depression, we should expect a negative relationship between depression and 
party identification (relatedly, see: Papageorgiou, Mattila and Rapeli 2019). 
Although this view makes intuitively sense, other research opens to alternative patterns. 
According to some study, milder depressed process information more systematically and 
analytically than non-depressed (von Helversen et al. 2011). Research on decision-making in 
depression shows that people vulnerable to depression take decisions but they do it differently 
than other people, by under-estimating and under-researching benefits of change due to biases 
in priors (Huys et al. 2015), by attending to negative over positive material (Gotlib and 
Joormann 2010), and by suffering losses more than enjoying gains (Leahy et al. 2012). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that the relationship between depression and party 
identification might not necessarily be a negative one. In a sense, depressives’ reluctance to 
participate can be overcome by the wish to regain control of their lives and of the outside 
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world. This argument finds support in other research on political participation, whereby 
persons with poor (mental) health engage in less demanding activities, such as signing 
petitions (Söderlund and Rapeli 2015; Couture and Breux 2017). Hence, if persons with 
depression relate the notion of external locus of control to politics, then identifying with a 
party can be a way to channel this desire for change. 
To sum up, I can test below whether there are differences in party identification between 
depressed and non-depressed, i.e. whether there is evidence of a depression-identification gap. 
 
Data and descriptive analyses 
To test my theoretical expectations I use data from Wave 1 of Understanding Society, the 
UKHLS,7 and from Round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS), a nationally-representative 
survey of individuals living in European countries. Understanding Society is a probability-
based panel survey of households with yearly interviews started in 2009 as a continuation of 
the British Household Panel Survey. Data collection for a single wave is scheduled across 24 
months.8 I apply a weight to adjust for design features of the survey, such as boosts to the 
ethnic minority and Northern Irish samples (details are provided in Section S2 of the 
Supplementary Information (SI) memo). 
The UKHLS is one of the few surveys including questions on respondents’ health conditions 
                                                
7 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research 
and Kantar Public, [producers]: Understanding Society: Wave 1-6, 2009-2015 [computer 
file]. 8th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Service [distributor], November 2016. SN: 
6614, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-8. 
8 Additional information about the survey’ sample design and data collection is available 
here: https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/d/308/mainstage-waves-1-6-user-
guide.pdf?1479807450. 
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and political attitudes, and provides measures of both diagnosed depression and self-rated 
depression in combination with questions on party attachment and vote intentions. Wave 1 
has the added value to provide interviews taken between 2009 and 2011, allowing for testing 
both the ideology-based the alternative status quo bias arguments.  
Studies on depression and political behavior use different measures of depression. Some 
research uses more “objective” measures with population-based register data with information 
on hospital discharge diagnoses and reimbursements for prescribed drugs (Sund et al. 
2017a,b). Other work relies on more “subjective” measures based on self-rated questions on 
respondents’ mental health (Ojeda 2015; Ojeda and Pacheco 2017). Psychiatry distinguishes 
between diagnosis as a trait and level of symptoms as state indicator, and so both measures 
are relevant. Since Understanding Society includes both, I report analyses based on both 
clinical depression and self-rated depression.  
Since a great deal of individuals who suffer from mental illness, including depression, are not 
fully aware of it or do not fully accept their condition and are reluctant to come out and ask 
for help (e.g., Corrigan 2005; Dobson and Dozois 2008a), self-rated measures would help 
reduce social desirability bias in diagnosis. Those suffering from severe depression are less 
likely to take part in such demanding surveys (Korkainen et al. 2001; Volken 2013) and this 
makes my analyses a conservative test of the difference between (all) clinical depressed and 
the rest of the population.  
My measure of clinical depression (CD) is based on two questions available in the survey’s 
Health and Disability Module. CD includes cases in which the respondent has actually been 
diagnosed with the condition and currently has it versus cases where the respondent's 
depression has never been detected by a doctor or a health professional. CD is a binary 
variable and the questions used to code this variable are reported extensively in Section S1 of 
the SI memo. Although the likelihood of experiencing subsequent episodes increases with 
each episode, what matters is that the respondent has the condition at the time of the survey 
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fieldwork. According to this coding, Wave 1 reports that 5% of respondents are clinically 
depressed, which is in line with WHO estimates.9 
My measure of self-rated depression (SRD) is based on questions on mental wellbeing 
captured by the 12-Item Short Form Health Survey (SF-12) (Ware et al. 1996). Although not 
strictly a depression inventory, this measure is a shorter version of SF-36 and is used to 
describe a set of clinically relevant health states that encompass the typical effects of 
depression on quality of life in an actual patient population (Sugar et al. 1998). Detailed 
questions are provided in Section S1 of the SI memo. Questions contain five categories which 
have been recoded into an index that goes theoretically from 6 to 30, where lower values 
denote poor mental health. In the multivariate analyses, SRD was reversed for an easier 
comparison with CD. The correlation between CD and SRD is 0.4 and is statistically 
significant at p < 0.01.   
My political measures are taken from the UKHLS Politics Module. For comparative 
purposes, in the descriptive analysis I separate whether a respondent identifies or not with a 
party and which party they feel closer to (I explain in the Multivariate Analyses section of the 
paper how I coded the dependent variables for the regression analyses). The former is coded 1 
if respondents feel closer to a party and zero otherwise. To measure identification with a 
specific party, I rely on a follow-up question. Those who replied positively to either of the 
previous questions were asked to name which party they feel closer to. To measure vote 
intentions, I rely on the subsample of respondents who replied that did not feel closer to any 
party and were subsequently asked if they would support a specific party if there were to be a 
general election tomorrow. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table S1. 
In addition to the UKHLS, I use data from the ESS for two reasons. The UKHLS does not 
                                                
9 Note that after Wave 1 the number of clinically depressed falls vertiginously due to attrition 
rate, and this is another reason for using data from Wave 1. 
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include a measure for respondents’ ideological orientation and allows me to replicate the UK-
based findings on party attachment on all Western European countries. 10  To measure 
ideological orientation, I rely on the classic 0-10 Left-Right self-placement scale. ESS does 
not include questions on diagnosed depression, but it does provide a depression inventory for 
population sample based on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D8) 
(Radloff 1977). This is a battery of eight questions about mental wellbeing that are similar to 
the ones available in the UKHLS, and so they can be used to construct a comparable measure 
of SRD (full detail of the questions is provided in Section S1 of the SI memo). Originally 
scored between 8 and 32, the measure is rescaled to ease interpretation to range between 0 
and 24, with higher values meaning higher depressive symptoms. Unfortunately, questions on 
party identification and party support are not constructed in the same way as in the British 
panel survey. That is, no follow-up question on vote intentions is available and, for this 
reason, analyses can only be replicated for party identification. Summary statistics are 
reported in Table S6. 
 
Initial patterns 
I first consider the association between depression and identification with a political party in 
Table 1. The left side of the table reports percentage values of depressed and non-depressed 
based on CD. For comparative purposes with CD, I recoded SRD in three categories and 
reported percentage values of the extreme categories in the right side of Table 1.11 By looking 
                                                
10 Countries included in this analysis below are Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
11 In the recoded SRD variable, category 1 takes values from 6 to 15, category 2 values from 
16 to 20 and category 3 values from 21 to 30. In Table 1 only the first and third categories are 
shown. 
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at CD we see that depressed are about 5 percentage points less likely to identify with a 
political party than non-depressed – 46% of depressed compared to 51% of non-depressed. 
This difference is confirmed by SRD with almost exactly the same proportions. This 
straightforward test gives a first hint that depressed identify with a party but less than non-
depressed. 
 
Table 1: Depressed identify with a party less than non depressed (UKHLS) 
 
 Clinical depression Self-rated depression 
 Depressed 
% 
Non-depressed 
% 
Depressed 
% 
Non-depressed 
% 
Yes 46 51 45 51 
No 54 49 55 49 
N 2083 43769 2642 39179 
Chi2’s p 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Next, the first two columns of Table 2 report percentage values for CD with the full sample 
and aim to address the theoretical arguments based on the left-right divide. Compared to non-
depressed, depressed are 10 percentage points less likely to feel closer to the Conservative 
Party and 4 percentage points more likely to feel closer to the Labour Party. This difference is 
even more astonishing when looking at SRD, where depressives are 15 percentage points 
more likely to feel closer to Labour. 
The possibility that depressives would behave not by following ideological divisions but by 
aligning to the status quo is tested in the remaining columns of Table 2. Wave 1 allows for 
this test because interviews are spread between 2009 and 2011, and so I divided the sample by 
using the date of the 2010 British general elections (May 6) as my cut-off point. If the follow-
the-status-quo argument holds, we should see a higher percentage of depressives feeling 
closer to Labour in the pre-election sample that shifts in favor of Conservatives (the new 
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incumbent) in the post-election sample. This actually happens neither with CD nor with SRD, 
where depressed tend to lean towards Labour and non-depressed towards Tories in both 
periods. (Descriptive analyses of vote choice produce similar results and so are reported in 
Table S2 of the SI memo.) Since no support is found for this alternative argument already in 
the descriptive analysis, below I focus on the first two results and present analyses that 
control for additional confounding factors.12  
 
Table 2: Depressed identify more (less) with Labour (Conservatives) 
compared to non-depressed (UKHLS) 
 
 Clinical depression Self-rated depression 
 Full 
sample 
Pre-2010 
election 
Post-2010 
election 
Full 
sample 
Pre-2010 
election 
Post-2010 
election 
 Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Conser
vatives 
28 38 28 38 32 41 29 40 27 39 32 42 
Labour 
 
44 40 48 42 45 41 55 40 55 41 54 39 
Others 
 
28 22 24 20 23 18 16 20 18 20 14 19 
N 914 21232 540 13231 322 7240 1077 18557 684 11962 390 6576 
Chi2’s 
p 
0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
The relationship between depressive symptoms and Left-Right orientation is tested with ESS 
data which report a negative and statistically significant correlation at p < 0.001 (r = -0.09). 
Although the correlation is quite weak, we can say that there is a modest but systematic 
                                                
12 Note that controlling for additional confounders in a regression model confirms the 
rejection of the new status quo alignment hypothesis and this is why only multivariate 
analyses for the other hypotheses are presented in the paper.   
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tendency for people with depressive symptoms to be left-wing, which is in line with the above 
patterns for party identification in Table 2. 
 
Multivariate analyses with UKHLS data 
I specify a multinomial logistic regression model to evaluate whether there is a relationship 
between depression and party identification. The dependent variable in the model is a 
categorical variable coded zero for non-identifiers, 1 for respondents who feel closer to the 
Conservative Party, and 2 for those who feel closer to the Labour Party. (In the model for 
party choice, I estimate a logistic regression, where party support is coded 1 for Labour and 0 
for Tories.) The main independent variables are CD and SRD. I recall that CD is a dummy 
variable capturing the presence of diagnosed depression, whereas SRD is a continuous 
variable recoded and reversed from 0 to 24 so that positive values mean higher depressive 
symptoms. The model includes country dummies for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.  
In line with previous research, I estimate the model while controlling for a series of socio-
demographic factors available in the survey: sex, age, age squared, education, income and 
marital status. The operationalization and summary statistics of all control variables is 
reported in the SI memo (Section 3 and Table S1). These variables are included in case of 
spurious correlation between depression and political predispositions. Also, while some are 
considered as risk factors for depression, others like education are likely to be posterior to 
depression but influence political predispositions, which makes the inclusion of such controls 
a more conservative test of a depression effect. The causes of depression are quite 
idiosyncratic, partly genetic, and not very political. This means that even if an important 
predictor of depression is not included, it is probably not closely associated with partisanship 
or vote choice – and vice versa. As outlined in the theory section, there is the possibility that 
some personality traits such as conscientiousness and openness to experience which are 
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linked to ideology and partisanship might also be associated with depression. Unfortunately, 
such questions are not available in Wave 1 preventing the opportunity to control for these 
factors. However, as discussed above, it is likely that depression cross-cuts these personality 
traits, including neuroticism which is likely to be closely related to depression but which 
tends not to be one of more politically relevant traits.      
Results from the multinomial logistic regressions are reported in Table S3, with no party 
identification being the baseline category. The negative and significant coefficient on the 
“identification with Conservative Party” category and the positive and significant (only for 
SRD) coefficient on the “identification with Labour Party” category support previous 
descriptive evidence. In Figure 1, I report the predicted probability of the depression variables 
on each of the categories of the dependent variable, holding other variables at their means, 
except for categorical variables hold at their mode.  
Figure 1 consists of two sets of panels. The upper panels plot the predicted probabilities from 
CD, while the lower panels show the predicted probabilities from SRD, with 95% confidence 
intervals. Panels A and D show the predicted probability to not identify with any party 
depending on the depression measurement. The negative effect previously detected reduces 
considerably (and basically dissipates with SRD) when controlling for other factors. 
Moreover, depressed have a lower probability than non-depressed to feel closer to the 
Conservative Party (panels B and E) and a higher probability than non-depressed to feel 
closer to the Labour Party (panels C and F), which supports previous descriptive evidence. 
The effects are not negligible, though the percentage difference is smaller in CD (about 4% 
for Conservatives and 1% for Labour, respectively) compared to SRD (about 12% for 
Conservatives and 10% for Labour).  
 
Figure 1: Depression and party identification (UKHLS) 
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Note: Plots are based on the models in Table S3. Sticks are 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Although CD and SRD are both imperfect measures of the same concept, a possible reason 
that accounts for larger effects with SRD has to do with the possibility that CD respondents 
might be more likely than SRD respondents to be receiving treatment. If this was the case, it 
would be reasonable to expect a larger depression effect among people who exhibit 
depressive symptoms but who are not under treatment. A simple calculation based on the 
categories of SRD used for Table 1 reveals that only 36% of people with high depressive 
symptoms were diagnosed with depression while the others report no diagnosis. This is quite 
telling and might have something to do with why the correlation found between CD and SRD 
is healthy but not extremely strong. However, it is hard to disentangle how many respondents 
were actually diagnosed with depression but did not answer accordingly because of social 
desirability and how many were not diagnosed because of stigma or some kind of inequality. 
To test whether there is a relationship between depression and vote choice I rely on those 
respondents who replied that did not feel closer to any party and were subsequently asked if 
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they would support a specific party if there were to be a general election tomorrow. These 
analyses (available in Table S4) largely confirm the analyses for party identification and show 
a positive coefficient on the depression variables (although not significant for CD). Predicted 
probabilities are plotted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Depression and party support (UKHLS) 
 
 Note: Plots are based on the models in Table S4. Sticks are 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
Multivariate analyses with ESS dataI now move to the results from ESS data. Figure 3 
displays the predicted probabilities from a multinomial logistic regression of SRD on each 
category of the dependent variable with 95% confidence intervals. Like for the previous 
models, controls and country dummies are included and weights are applied following the 
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ESS advice (analyses reported in Table S7).13 Panel A shows the predicted probability to not 
identify with any party, panel B to identify with the largest mainstream right party, and panel 
C to identify with the largest mainstream left party (parties are listed in Table S5). These 
analyses tend to substantiate previous results from the British case in that the probability to 
not identify with a party slightly increases when depressive symptoms increase but the slope 
and confidence intervals do not allow to make much of it. Further, depressed are more likely 
to feel closer to mainstream left parties and less likely to identify with mainstream right 
parties.  
 
Figure 3: Depressive symptoms and party identification in Western Europe 
(ESS) 
 
                                                
13 For cross-sectional analyses, ESS survey designers recommend the usage of a population 
size weight in combination with a post-stratification weight. For details see Section S2 in the 
SI memo. 
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Note: Plots are based on the models in Table S7. Sticks are 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Finally, Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of the OLS regression model with the left-right 
self-placement as the dependent variable, with weights, controls and country dummies. For 
this analysis, I rescaled SRD from 0 to 10 (mean 2.11 and standard deviation 1.62) to match 
the left-right scale. The coefficient on the SRD variable is -0.08 (p < 0.001), meaning that a 
one-unit shift in SRD is associated with almost a 0.1 change in the left-right scale (analysis 
reported in Table S8). This effect is meaningful as a two-standard deviation change in SRD 
shifts a person’s predicted left-right self-placement by about one third of a unit on the left-
right scale. 
 
Figure 4: Depression and left-right orientation in Western Europe (ESS) 
 
Note: The plot is based on the model in Table S8. Sticks are 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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The prevalence of depression and depressive symptoms in our societies is well known. 
Psychological research has found several differences in cognitive and emotional processes of 
people vulnerable to depression and its symptoms have important implications for motivation 
and resource to participate in daily life activities. Political scientists have identified a further 
important difference known as depression-voting gap. This paper extends previous research 
and explores differences in political predispositions, namely, party attachment, party support 
and left-right orientation.  
Evidence from survey data from Understanding Society and the ESS suggests a moderate but 
systematic tendency: people vulnerable to depression are less likely to identify with 
mainstream right parties and to support them and are less likely to place themselves in the 
right side of the ideological spectrum. This is especially the case with depressive symptoms 
for which effects are larger than with diagnosed depression. On the other hand, there is no 
systematic evidence of a depression-identification gap or that depressives’ partisanship (and 
vote intentions) is driven by attitudes to change rather than ideological orientations. This is 
interesting because identifying reference removed’s analyses of attitudes in the UK Brexit 
referendum find evidence of a status quo bias in clinically depressed people when risk is high 
and partisan evaluations do not primarily shape decision-making. This does not seem to be the 
case in the context of general elections. 
This paper has several limitations that future research needs to address. First, the use of 
survey data and available measures of depression carry along a number of biases including 
non-response and social desirability, as discussed above. However, the fact that the analyses 
reported in the paper find evidence of a relationship between depression and political 
predispositions, I believe that the real world connection may actually be stronger, because of 
our poor measurement of depression. 
Second, if there is a bias against the right as the paper suggests, we need to unpack left-right 
to be able to say something about the nature of this bias. In which dimensions depressives are 
 22 
more liberal? In addition, we need to establish the origin of this bias, i.e. whether this is due 
to an affective/loyalty link or to a more rational link, whereby depressives would feel closer 
to and support parties they share their ideology and policy preferences with. My findings can 
only give a hint. The fact that depressed are not much more likely to identify with a party than 
non-depressed is already perhaps a clue about how they see party support, that is, less as an 
emotional crutch – because in that case we would expect them to be more likely to be 
identifiers – and perhaps more of a rational support for a party sharing their ideology/policy 
preferences. 
Third, the lack of a clear evidence for a depression-identification gap does not tell us much 
about the causal relationship between depression and party identification. Future research 
needs to explore the stability and change of party attachments in depression, including its 
cycle into the picture. Papageorgiou et al. (2019) have started doing this with general health 
and we need to extend this avenue to mental health. Party identification tends to develop in 
adolescence with the family being an incredibly important factor (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 
2014). Thus, it may be that depression in adolescence, when political attitudes are not yet 
fully crystallized, influences party identification differently than depression in adulthood, 
after party attachments have been formed.  
Finally, I want to conclude with some thoughts about the implications of my findings for 
political engagement. If there is a depression-voting gap but not much of a depression-
identification gap and a bias against the right, parties – especially the ones on the left – need 
to make an effort to mobilize those voters with depression who identify with them but who 
would not necessarily turnout because of their cognitive and physical impairments. In 
addition, while studies have found significant depression effects on abstention, they are not 
huge effects: namely, some depressed people do vote, so it is worth seeking their support 
anyway. However, given that the bias against the right is not huge, the challenge is open. 
The UK is an insightful case in this regard. The fact that the promoters of the mental health 
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reform in Britain have been the Coalition government and, subsequently, the Conservative 
Party (perhaps simply because they were the ones in charge) cannot leave the Labour Party 
indifferent. It is hard to say whether the British Conservatives’ activity in government is an 
attempt to steal the mental health issue from the Labour’s hands, or at least their reputation to 
competently handling the issue (Petrocik 1996). In the 2010 case analyzed this seemed not to 
be the case. Yet it is hard to say whether this was due to different levels of issue attention – 
the 2010 Conservative Party manifesto (Conservative Party 2010) does not mention 
depression or support for people with mental health issues at all (except in reference to 
veterans), while the Labour Party manifesto (Labour Party 2010) does mention support for 
late-life depression and mental illness more broadly – or to a more systematic left bias. In 
2015 and, subsequently, in 2017, the Tories caught up with Labour and mental health became 
an important issue in their manifestos, to the extent that the Conservative Party pledged to 
reform the Mental Health Act (Conservative Party 2017). Whether mental health has become 
a valence issue or not, agenda-setting needs to translate into policy-making to promote anti-
stigma policies that incentivize political engagement of people with poor mental health. 
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